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CONSTITUTING CIVIL SOCIETY: SCHOOL VOUCHERS,
RELIGIOUS NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS, AND LIBERAL
PUBLIC VALUES
STEPHEN MACEDO*
LIBERALISM AND CIVIL SOCIETY REVIVALISM
The current revival of interest in civil society institutions raises
important questions about our constitutional project. Has the
extension of liberal constitutionalist principles of freedom and
equality for all-a movement that came to a head in the "rights
revolution" of the 1960s-been lethal to the seedbeds of virtue, as
Linda C. McClain and James E. Fleming have asked?' Must the
reinvigoration of particular moral and religious communities come at
the expense of the overarching ideals of our liberal democratic
constitutional order? Perhaps most comprehensively: what is the
proper relationship between the many differing moral and religious
communities and traditions in our society, and the overarching values
of the liberal democratic constitutional order as a whole?
I agree with McClain and Fleming that there is good reason to
worry that today's emphasis on character formation and moral
education in civil society could come at the expense of efforts to more
fully realize liberal ideals. Many of the themes of civil society
revivalists were anticipated in the 1980s by communitarians and civic
republicans who argued that the liberal preoccupation with individual
rights leads to the neglect of communal ties and civic virtue.2 In
* Laurance S. Rockefeller Professor of Politics and the University Center for Human
Values, Princeton University; Director of Princeton's Program on Law and Public Affairs. He is
the author most recently of DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: Civic EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY (2000).
1. See generally Linda C. McClain & James E. Fleming, Some Questions for Civil Society
Revivalists, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 301 (2000). For a thorough discussion of the civic malaise in
our society, see generally COUNCIL ON CiIL Soc'y, A CALL TO CIVIL SOCIETY: WHY
DEMOCRACY NEEDS MORAL TRUTHS (1998); NATIONAL COMM'N ON Civic RENEWAL, A
NATION OF SPECTATORS: How CiviC DISENGAGEMENT WEAKENS AMERICA AND WHAT WE
CAN DO ABOUT IT (1998).
2 See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
(1984); ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988); MICHAEL J.
SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY
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addition, cultural conservatism and opposition to an expansive
national government lead many on the political right to seek to
transfer authority and resources to local governments and private
institutions in civil society in order to move away from national ideals
of individual freedom and equality for all.3 There is good reason to
worry that the revival of interest in local and particular communities
could come at the expense of the constitutional ideals of liberal
justice that should unite us all.
In this essay, I will address anxieties about the civil society
revival by arguing that there is quite a lot that public policy and
institutional design can and should do to help insure that liberal
democratic ideals are promoted within the sphere of civil society. I
will focus on two issues: (1) educational voucher programs that
include religious schools and (2) the flow of public funds to religiously
affiliated nonprofit institutions that provide social services. However,
I will argue that the flow of public monies to religious schools and
nonprofit institutions should come with "strings attached" designed to
insure that public purposes are served. The predictable result will be
that some religious institutions and communities will have to
compromise their spiritual mission in order to enjoy access to public
funds. Indeed, the flow of public funds to civil society institutions will
likely create pressures on many communities and groups to conform
to public values, including religious freedom and even
nondiscrimination.
Even a liberal democratic constitutional order-in which
freedom of association is a great value-counts on an adequate level
of support from the norm-generating and character-educating
institutions, groups, and associations of civil society. There may be
good public reasons to rely on civil society institutions to a greater
extent than we have in the past-whether for education or the
delivery of social services-but we have. no reason to increase our
dependence on the vagaries of civil society. We should do what we
reasonably can to insure that publicly subsidized civil society
institutions serve liberal democratic values.
(1996); CHARLES TAYLOR, Atomism, in PHILOSOPHY AND THE HUMAN SCIENCES 187, 187-210
(1985).
3. See William A. Schambra, Local Groups Are the Key to America's Civic Renewal,
BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1997, at 20,20-22.
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LIBERALISM'S CIVIL SOCIETY CRISIS?
Are "civil society" institutions in decline, and if so, how great a
problem is this for liberal democratic societies? These are among the
most hotly debated issues in political science today. "Civil society"
designates those associations, groups, and communities intermediate
between the family and the state. Many, though by no means all,
social and political scientists argue that social disconnection is
increasing, and that this has unfortunate consequences for political
life and general well-being.
Robert D. Putnam argues that Americans socialize less, fewer
know their neighbors, they go to meetings less frequently and belong
to fewer clubs and associations.4  Eric Uslaner argues that social
disconnection leads to a generalized social distrust and a declining
sense of optimism, and people who are generally distrustful of others
are less likely to engage in political or civic activities.'
I am not going to belabor the problem. These worries may be
exaggerated, maybe not. It is striking that many different
philosophers and social scientists have converged on a similar set of
worries at approximately the same time, both in America and abroad.
Moreover, no one is arguing that Americans or other citizens of
advanced democracies participate too much, are too community-
oriented, or are neglectful of their narrow private interests. Even
those who defend the predominant role of private freedom and self-
interest in modem commercial republics have long argued that it is
worth doing what we can to elevate and broaden self-interest by
promoting participation in groups and associations.6
There are different ways of looking at the role of civil society in a
4. Compare Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital, 6 J.
DEMOCRACY 65 (1995), and Robert D. Putnam, Tuning in, Tuning Out: The Strange
Disappearance of Social Capital in America, 28 POL. SCI. & POL. 664 (1995), with Everett C.
Ladd, The Data Just Don't Show Erosion of America's "Social Capital," PUB. PERSP., June-July
1996, at 1. For alternative views regarding the role of civil associations in society, see generally
E. J. Dionne, Jr., Why Civil Society? Why Now?, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1997, at 4; William A.
Galston & Peter Levine, America's Civic Condition, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1997, at 23; Theda
Skocpol, Building Community: Top-Down or Bottom-Up?, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1997, at 16.
5. See generally Eric Uslaner, Faith, Hope, and Charity: Social Capital, Trust, and
Collective Action (Nov. 1995) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the author); see also Robert
Lane, The Joyless Polity: Contributions of Democratic Process to Ill-Being, in CITIZEN
COMPETENCE AND DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS (Stephen L. Elkin & Karol Edward Soltan
eds., 1999).
6. See generally BENJAMIN CONSTANT, The Liberty of the Ancients Compared with That
of the Moderns, in POLITICAL WRITINGS 308 (Biancamaria Fontana ed. & trans., 1988); ALEXIS




liberal democracy. One way is to view the sphere of free association
as a sphere of social differentiation and diversity: a place where
particular groups of like-minded people come together to pursue
their own idiosyncratic aims and interests, to oppose or support the
powers that be, to intervene in or withdraw from the larger society, to
contest dominant values and norms, and to satisfy their own peculiar
psychological needs. This is a principal thrust of Nancy L.
Rosenblum's important book Membership and Morals, which
proposes that the moral valence of associational life is indeterminate.
Even groups widely regarded as both unattractive and incongruent
with the basic values of liberal democracy-from religious sects to
militia groups to privatistic homeowners associations -can provide
important psychological benefits for members, and they can help
contain what society regards as vices. "There is no systematic
answer," says Rosenblum, "to whether we can depend on the
associations of civil society to cultivate the moral dispositions liberal
democracy requires, or whether to use public incentives and the force
of law to create and enhance liberalizing, democratizing groups."7
I do not want to dispute or deny the value of freedom in free
association. Nor would I deny that the moral consequences of
associational life are often idiosyncratic and dependent on the
psychological needs of particular individuals. Nothing I say in what
follows should be taken to deny the importance of leaving space in
the associational landscape for many forms of diversity, and for
distinctive enclaves marked by idiosyncrasy, contrariness, and even
hostility to our most cherished ideals. I do not want to ignore
Rosenblum's important cautionary tale. Our political ideals should
be subject to criticism, and the diversity of civil society is therefore a
crucial public resource. But there is another part of the picture,
which Rosenblum tends to discount. Even a free, individualistic
society is-to a greater degree than is often allowed-a particular
type of society as a whole, having its own distinctive patterns and
overarching values. We are free individuals first and foremost but we
are also citizens, and the freedom of everyone depends upon a
common willingness to support democratic institutions and to respect
the rights of other citizens in spite of differences of race, religion,
ethnicity, religion, gender, sexual orientation, and other arbitrary
factors. There are, indeed, positive liberal democratic ideals that go
7. NANCY L. ROSENBLUM, MEMBERSHIP AND MORALS: THE PERSONAL USES OF
PLURALISM IN AMERICA 15 (1998).
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beyond the mere survival of our political institutions: we want citizens
to be able to deliberate together about shared concerns and to
cooperate in formal institutions and less formal social settings in
order to solve their common problems. We need to think about the
ways in which our institutions either support, or do not support, the
habits, attitudes, and character traits needed by freely self-governing
citizens.
While there is much to be learned from Rosenblum's impressive
study, I believe she goes too far when she insists that "the heart of
liberalism has been to guard against the tutelary or manipulative
intent of authorities, particularly political authorities, who want to
mold minds, call up moral sentiments, or exact displays of virtue and
enthusiasm." The problem here is with the word "exact," and
Rosenblum's insistence that "in the hands of officials, these are
familiar excuses for tyranny."9 What of all that might be done short
of "exaction" and "tyranny" to promote forms of character
appropriate to the free and reasonable citizens of an extended
republic? Indeed, was not the choice of an extended republic by
those who ratified the Constitution a choice to favor certain types of
interests and to discourage others? Among the "latent causes of
faction" whose effects Madison argued would be more easily
controlled in a large republic, is a "zeal for different opinions
concerning religion, concerning government, and many other
points."'10 In a large and diverse republic, the zealous partisans of
narrow orthodoxies would be put at a disadvantage in the
competition for political power, as compared with those prepared to
enter into political combinations requiring compromise and
cooperation with diverse coalitions of citizens. Indeed, Madison
argues that an extended republic would give the advantage to those
prepared to justify their political aims openly or publicly, and that, in
itself, would tend to favor those parties of justice and the common
good." Fairly large electoral districts would likewise favor those
prepared to engage in broad forms of political cooperation, and to
build coalitions across a diverse array of interests: the individuals
chosen in such settings (it was hoped) would tend to be the "impartial
& Id. at 14.
9. Id.
10. THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 79 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961). For a
useful discussion on the subject, see generally Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's Wager:
Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Order, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 347 (1995).
11. See THE FEDERALIST No. 10, at 83.
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arbiter" prepared to promote "the general interests of the society.' 2
The success of the Constitution would depend upon the people's
willingness to transcend local differences and particularisms - the
relative homogeneity found within the states-in favor of the
overarching substantive values of an extended commercial republic.
In an important sense, the Constitution was indeed an attempt to
mold minds, call up moral sentiments, and to promote forms of social
life and citizen character appropriate to a large commercial republic.
The framers of the Constitution did not refrain from "soulcraft," or
the defense of institutions designed to "manipulate" (in some
respects) people's deepest commitments. What saves this
"manipulation" from the charge of tyranny is that it is gentle, openly
justified, consistent with respect for basic freedoms, and subject to
democratic ratification and ongoing deliberation.3
While the framers of the Constitution designed a scheme of
government that depended on a measure of civic virtue, they did not
provide anything like a complete account of the sources of political
education. The Constitution itself does not explicitly provide for the
educational institutions on which it depends, and that could be
accounted as a weakness. Many in the founding generation argued
that a national republic needed a national educational program, but
this task fell largely to state and local governments. 14 Nevertheless,
while education has long been primarily a local responsibility in
America, those who designed the system of common schooling in this
country in the late 1830s and 1840s did so with an eye to the needs of
an increasingly diverse national republic. Publicly supported
common schools were seen as the best way of promoting popular
enlightenment and ties of mutual understanding and cooperation
across the bounds of class, ethnicity, and religion. What was
increasingly wanted was a system of schooling that would meet public
needs: schools that were, as Selwyn K. Troen has put it, "agents of the
12 Id. NO. 35, at216 (Alexander Hamilton).
13. For the charge that the founders of the republic did not attend adequately to
"soulcraft" and the promotion of citizen virtue, see GEORGE F. WILL, STATECRAFr AS
SOULCRAFr (1983). I certainly would not argue that the Constitution provides an adequate or
complete educational scheme.
14. See Robert Coram, Political Inquiries: To Which Is Added, a Plan for the General
Establishment of Schools Throughout the United States, in ESSAYS ON EDUCATION IN THE
EARLY REPUBLIC (Frederick Rudolph ed., 1965) (1791); Benjamin Rush, Plan for the
Establishment of Public Schools and the Diffusion of Knowledge in Pennsylvania, in ESSAYS ON
EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (Frederick Rudolph ed., 1965) (1786); Noah Webster,
On the Education of Youth, in ESSAYS ON EDUCATION IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC (Frederick
Rudolph ed., 1965) (1790).
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community and... dedicated to its service."' 5  Educational variety
would thwart attempts to bring all children together under the
auspices of a common republican culture.
Parochial schools addressed themselves to other ends: they
served the interests of particular religious and ethnic communities.
Arguing against his own fellow Congregationalists, the Reverend
W.S. Dutton insisted, in the pages of Horace Mann's Common School
Journal, that
the children of this country, of whatever parentage, should, not
wholly, but to a certain extent, be educated together,-be educated,
not as Baptists, or Methodists, or Episcopalians, or Presbyterians;
not as Roman Catholics or Protestants, still less as foreigners in
language or spirit, but as Americans, as made of one blood and
citizens of the same free country, - educated to be one harmonious
people. This, the common school system, if wisely and liberally
conducted, is well fitted, in part at least, to accomplish.16
A miscellaneous mix of educational institutions serving
particular needs would not reliably forge a common moral and
political culture in an increasingly diverse population. The
educational model that spread from New England across the country
over the course of the nineteenth century was a locally controlled but
common school system with a monopoly on tax support, an institution
that would by its nature be public in orientation. 17 As I argue at
length elsewhere, the reasons for favoring this institution were not
only prejudice against Catholics, xenophobia, and racism-though
these abhorrent features of nineteenth century American life must
not be denied-but also, and I believe crucially, a desire to overcome
divisions among citizens (including divisions of class, ethnicity, and
religion) in order to foster friendship, cooperation, and
reasonableness among all the citizens of the political community.18
The public school system embodies America's determination to forge
a shared civic culture even in the face of the challenge of deep
normative diversity, and this vital project should be kept in mind as
we contemplate both educational reform and policies that effect the
structure of relations in civil society.
15. SELWYN K. TROEN, THE PUBLIC AND THE SCHOOLS 52 (1975); see also DIANE
RAVITCH, THE GREAT SCHOOL WARS 17-24 (1974).
16. CHARLES LESLIE GLENN, THE MYTH OF COMMON SCHOOLING 223-24 (1988).
17. See DAVID B. TYACK & ELIZABETH HANSOT, MANAGERS OF VIRTUE 19-31 (1982).
18. See generally STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION IN A
MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 51-130 (2000).
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CIVIL SOCIETY AND THE CHALLENGE OF DIVERSITY
It may well be that in the future we will come to rely more than
we have on the educative and character-shaping resources of civil
society institutions. This will furnish greater reason to be concerned
from a civic standpoint about the consequences of membership in
civil society. To notice and take account of the politically educative
dimensions of civil society is not, I should emphasize, to provide a
justification for coercive intervention or for limiting freedom of
association, but the instruments of public policy are often subtle.
Public policy and institutional design influence the ways that people
use their freedom. At the heart of liberalism is an insistence on the
protection of a broad array of individual and group freedoms, but
liberalism does not require that public policy must have neutral
consequences for the way that people use their freedom, nor does it
reject the noncoercive promotion of civic virtue.
There are, of course, critics of liberalism-including the
communitarians and civic republicans alluded to earlier-who argue
that the "liberal vision of freedom lacks the civic resources to sustain
self-government." 19 The core commitment of liberalism, according to
Michael Sandel, is the "resolve that government be neutral on moral
and religious questions, that fundamental questions of public policy
be debated and decided without reference to any particular
conception of the good."2  Sandel offers a thin caricature of a
liberalism whose central feature is an unsustainable commitment to
moral neutrality.21 Oddly, there are those who want to celebrate this
caricature of liberalism, not to disparage it (as Sandel wishes to do)
but to deploy it against more robust liberal civic ideals.
Intellectual spokesmen for Evangelical Christianity have
discovered the advantages of the language of multiculturalism and
epistemological pluralism. Science and public reason are merely
powerful belief structures that have no real claim to political
authority. Religious fundamentalists have their own worldview, their
own hermeneutic, and their own way of life, and so, the argument
goes, they qualify for multicultural concern and should be exempted
19. SANDEL, supra note 2, at 6.
20. Michael J. Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REv. 1765, 1793 (1994)
(reviewing JOHN RAwLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM (1993)).
21. See STEPHEN MACEDO, LIBERAL VIRTUES: CITIZENSHIP, VIRTUE, AND COMMUNITY




from public school programs at odds with their worldview. 22 Michael
McConnell argues that a system of education vouchers would be truer
to American liberal principles than is the system of publicly
controlled schooling: "The education best suited to the American
republic, like the religion best suited to the American republic, is
based on the principle of diversity and choice." 23  McConnell is
prepared to press his multicultural convictions further than most:
"The Religion Clauses of the First Amendment meant that we would
not have a common civic culture at the most fundamental level."24
The founders, on his interpretation, knew that such a course was
politically dangerous, "yet they took the risk."5
McConnell celebrates Sandel's homeopathic version of
liberalism, proceduralist, neutralist, and morally thin, in order to
preclude attempts to marry liberalism to positive ideals of civic life.
McConnell argues, in effect, that it would be improper for the
government to foster a shared civic culture if doing so would lead to
the transformation of religious beliefs and practices. Governments
are, on his view, obliged to design policies that are neutral in their
effects on religion. More specifically, the "baseline" of judgments
regarding the legitimacy of a law or governmental practice "is the
hypothetical world in which individuals make decisions about religion
on the basis of their own religious conscience, without the influence
of government."26  "The underlying principle is that governmental
action should have the minimum possible effect on religion,
consistent with achievement of the government's legitimate
purposes. '27 Government actions amount to improper establishments
of religion, according to McConnell, when their "purpose or probable
effect [is] to increase religious uniformity, either by inhibiting
religious practice (a Free Exercise Clause violation) or by forcing or
22. See STEPHEN BATES, BATTLEGROUND: ONE MOTHER'S CRUSADE, THE RELIGIOUS
RIGHT, AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF OUR CLASSROOMS 314 (1993); Nomi Maya
Stolzenberg, He Drew a Circle That Shut Me Out. Assimilation, Indoctrination, and the Paradox
of Liberal Education, 106 HARV. L. REV. 581,582-83 (1993).
23. Michael W. McConnell, Multiculturalism, Majoritarianism, and Educational Choice:
What Does Our Constitutional Tradition Have to Say?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 123, 123.
24. Id. at 133.
25. Id.
26. Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 115, 169
(1992).
27. Id.; see also Michael W. McConnell & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Approach to
Issues of Religious Freedom, 56 U. Cm. L. REv. 1, 37 (1989). But see Christopher L. Eisgruber
& Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of Boerne v. Flores,
in 1997: SUPREME COURT REVIEW 79-139 (Dennis J. Hutchinson et al. eds., 1998).
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inducing a contrary religious practice (an Establishment Clause
violation), without sufficient justification." 2
The principle that government actions should have neutral
effects on the religious beliefs that compete in society has been
soundly rejected by most liberals, and for good reason. For one thing,
everything that government does will have nonneutral effects. It is
also impossible to imagine how one would go about determining the
ways in which government action has influenced the religious beliefs
of citizens. Moreover, should the inquiry extend to statutes and
policies only, or should constitutional provisions be scrutinized as
well? The problem is that the Constitution itself runs afoul of
McConnell's principle of neutrality of effects. Specifically, the
Constitution was designed to undermine the political influence of
narrow and insular forms of zealotry. The effect of this design would
be to favor tolerant sects prepared to engage in trustful cooperation
with citizens of many faiths. The Constitution's own nonneutrality
suggests that McConnell's principle is dubious.
Adopting the principle of neutral effects would also be extremely
divisive. It would encourage citizens to be constantly regarding laws
and government actions from the point of view of their differing
sectarian standpoints, striving to discover whether every religious
group is burdened equally. The very complexity and uncertainty of
this project and the inevitability that perceptions of benefits and
burdens will be significantly colored by partiality to one's own sect
would sow mistrust and conflict among religious groups.
McConnell seems to believe that public authority to promote a
common civic culture runs out once peace and mere toleration have
been established among competing religious factions. However, the
Constitution itself points in the direction of deliberative politics and a
society in which cooperation is fostered across the bounds of
particular and local allegiances. Quite apart from what the
Constitution envisages, it is hard to see how the Constitution
prohibits popularly elected governments from adopting policies in the
realms of education and social life to encourage popular
enlightenment, the capacity for reflective and self-critical
deliberation, and broad forms of social cooperation. Of course, all
such policies will have nonneutral impacts on differing religious
traditions.
Not surprisingly, sensible liberals reject the requirement that
28. McConnell, supra note 26, at 169.
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government actions should have neutral effects on religious beliefs.
As John Rawls put it:
it is surely impossible for the basic structure of a just constitutional
regime not to have important effects and influences as to which
comprehensive doctrines [including religious doctrines] endure and
gain adherents over time; and it is futile to try to counteract these
effects and influences, or even to ascertain for political purposes
how deep and pervasive they are. We must accept the facts of
common sense sociology.... Neutrality of effect or influence
political liberalism abandons as impracticable.2 9
It is important to stress, as Kathleen M. Sullivan has noted, that
our overarching civic framework is not to be regarded as one
competing sectarian view among others. 30 The point of view of public
reflection about justice is the common authoritative standpoint from
which we construct and justify the principles that define basic
freedoms and that allocate authority among private persons, groups,
and public agencies. The shared constitutional framework provides
institutions within which constitutional principles and public policies
are openly debated, enacted, criticized, contested, and revised. The
defense of this shared order does not rest on a single account of
religious truth, or one particular view of man's place in the cosmos.
Instead, the justification for our shared civic project invokes urgent
political imperatives and principles of political morality that are
accessible to reasonable people of many faiths.31 There is never any
guarantee that the public morality or democratically chosen policies
will be neutral in their effects on the various ways of life of citizens.
Indeed, it would seem to be the most natural thing in the world that
membership in religious and cultural communities ebbs and flows in
response to all sorts of changing cultural, economic, and political
factors. It would seem not only natural but appropriate for
communities and traditions to change as the ideas and principles
associated with liberal justice settle into a society. Not only is there
no reason to try and correct for these nonneutral effects on religious
and cultural communities, we count on the communities changing in
ways that are supportive of liberal democracy.3 2
29. JOHN RAWLS, POLMCAL LIBERALISM 193 (1993).
30. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Religion and Liberal Democracy, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 195,
199-201 (1992).
31. See generally MACEDO, supra note 18; RAWLS, supra note 29.
32. For a longer discussion on this issue, see generally MACEDO, supra note 18; see also
Stephen Macedo, Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of Religion: Defending the
Moderate Hegemony of Liberalism, 26 POL. THEORY 56,56-89 (1998).
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LIBERAL CIVIL SOCIETY: PLURALISM AND INCLUSION
Many who express doubts about civil society revivalism are
skeptical because they see "neo-Tocquevillians" as advancing the
simple claim that groups and associations are good for democracy.
But groups and associations are not necessarily seedbeds of good
citizenship. For a society to be "rich in civil associations" could mean
that it is plagued by anti-democratic underground groups on the far
right or the far left-groups at odds with basic principles of liberty
and equality for all. We need to make sure that the ideal of civil
society that we promote is indeed one that we have reason to believe
will tend to support our largest and most inclusive civic ideals.
It is not sufficiently emphasized in the literature on civil society
that our aim should be to promote a certain structure of groups and
associations. The appropriate structure is captured in labor
economist Mark Granovetter's phrase, "the strength of weak ties," as
well as in the older and very basic emphasis in political science on the
importance of "cross-cutting cleavages." Liberal democratic virtues
are most reliably fostered when citizens have multiple and cross-
cutting memberships: a variety of memberships and only partially
overlapping affiliations that do not reinforce a consistent set of social
cleavages. The crucial thing is to foster memberships that are not
tribalistic but pluralistic.
A pluralistic, cross-cutting pattern of groups and associations is
important both for the freedom of individuals, and for civic virtue.
For individuals, a variety of memberships that do not consistently
reinforce each other help individuals maintain a critical stance on
their memberships. That is, no one affiliation or set of affiliations
provides an unproblematic or simple answer to the question "who am
I?" While downplaying the idea that there is a general story to be
told about the relationship between associations and liberal
democracy, Nancy Rosenblum does not hesitate to affirm the
importance of pluralism to freedom:
[I]t does not suffice for moral development that the social stock of
values and practices carried by associations is abundant if the lives
of men and women are terminally fixed and situated, if they are
unable to exploit the freedom of association. The possibility of
shifting involvements among associations -the experience of
pluralism by men and women personally and individually-is what
counts.33
33. ROSENBLUM, supra note 7, at 17.
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Pluralism is indeed vital to individual freedom and the civic
health of liberal democracies, and we should not downplay its
distinctiveness. This pluralism is implicit in Madison's account of the
advantages of an extended republic.
For liberal democratic societies as a whole, cross-cutting patterns
of membership help insure that social divisions do not run too deep.
Group allegiances nurture the personal interaction and individualized
monitoring needed to enforce group norms, assay the reliability of
our peers, reward cooperators, punish defectors, and thereby
promote cooperation. Intensely inward-looking and insular group
allegiances, however, deter wider forms of cooperation: tribalism is at
odds with the openness of liberal citizenship at its best, which is
characterized by patterns of reciprocity and trust that transcend the
bounds of ethnicity, race, class and region. We foster a pluralistic
liberal pattern of associations because our civic aim is to promote
cooperation and reciprocity not only within particular groups but also
across groups. The importance of a pluralistic structure of group life
is reaffirmed by Durkheim, Kornhauser, and Putnam, as well as
Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, who argue that "pluralism,
even if not explicitly political pluralism, may indeed be one of the
most important foundations of political democracy."'34
Leaders of extremist groups resist the pull of fragmented
loyalties and moderated commitments. Consider Raphael S.
Ezekial's portrait of the typical American neo-Nazi or Klan leader:
The white supremacist leader has proven successfully to himself
that he doesn't have to make it in the ordinary world.... He has
tried out his style on a small world he creates, and on the sector of
the mainstream world with which he interacts. He avoids
distracting entanglements; he builds a small world, mostly of
followers, that confirms him; he avoids entanglements that would
cause doubt.35
Social orders that promote both individual freedom and broad
forms of social cooperation are, therefore, pluralistic: societies in
which groups compete with each other and with the state for the
allegiances of individuals, and in which individuals' loyalties are
34. GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA, THE CIVIC CULTURE: POLITICAL
ATITUDES AND DEMOCRACY IN FIVE NATIONS 322 (1963). See generally EMILE DURKHEIM,
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS (Cornelia Brookfield trans., 1957); WILLIAM
KORNHAUSER, THE POLITICS OF MASS SOCIETY (1959); ROBERT D. PUTNAM, MAKING
DEMOCRACY WORK: CIVIC TRADITIONS IN MODERN ITALY (1993).
35. RAPHAEL S. EZEKIAL, THE RACIST MIND: PORTRAITS OF AMERICAN NEO-NAzIS
AND KLANSMEN 146 (1995).
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divided among a variety of "cross-cutting" (or only partially
overlapping) memberships and affiliations.
The danger in the new emphasis on civil society is that it could
serve as an excuse for the abandonment of our largest and most
inclusive civic ideals. We should reappreciate the virtues of small
communities, not as a way of turning our backs on the individual
freedoms and equality made possible by national institutions, but to
better realize the complex values that compose a liberal democratic
civic life properly understood. It is not the lack of entanglements but
the variety of cross-cutting associative ties that helps ward off
oppression and tyranny, whether from the centralized state or from
groups themselves. 36 Groups are, therefore, crucial to the project of
moral education and citizen formation in a modern mass society, but
if civil society is to foster freedom and wide forms of reciprocity and
reasonableness, we should favor an overall structure of group life that
is pluralistic.
SCHOOL REFORM AND CIVIL SOCIETY
Today's debates over school reform present the possibility of a
momentous shift in American public policy, a shift that seems already
underway. In place of the unified systems designed to educate all the
children of the community in a public institution, today's reform
proposals often aim to promote educational variety, parental choice,
competition among schools, and even privatization. Public schools
are often (and often justly) portrayed as bureaucratic, remote, and
impersonal institutions that fail to gain the support of families and
communities outside the school, and that fail to create nurturing
communities within the school. The Council on Civil Society
therefore calls for the creation of more 'charter schools. Charter
schools are often formed within existing public school buildings and
they depend on their ability to attract students who wish to attend.
They can often hire and fire their own teachers, and they can flexibly
define their own distinctive mission. Because charter schools are
smaller than other public schools, and because families choose the
school and its mission, charter schools may be better able than other
public schools to promote a shared ethos and sense of community
among teachers and students within the school. Charter schools also
permit energetic educators to create a variety of more focused




educational experiments within the public system.37
The Council on Civil Society is also sympathetic to voucher
proposals: "To enhance parental authority in the upbringing of their
children, and to improve education by enhancing accountability, we
urge government at all levels to expand the ability of parents to
choose the schools their children attend." 38 Vouchers are extremely
controversial when they allow parents to choose religious schools.
There is plausible (though disputed) evidence that current voucher
experiments are yielding educational benefits. Insofar as vouchers
are targeted at poorer children or the worst performing schools -as in
the programs designed in Milwaukee, Cleveland, and Florida-they
may help promote more equal educational attainment. In addition,
Milwaukee Mayor John Norquist plausibly argues that providing
choice within a troubled urban setting may be an effective way of
keeping some middle class families from moving to the suburbs.3 9
Vouchers are often defended not simply as a way of increasing
competition among schools, but also as a way of invigorating the
educational influence of churches, families, and other communities in
civil society. Voucher opponents have many concerns, including the
fear that funding sectarian schools will contribute to social
"Balkanization" and undermine children's freedom. If public
education funds flow to schools representing particular religious
communities (the vast majority of nonpublic schools in America are
religious schools), then the structure of American education policy
will no longer tilt to the same degree in favor of efforts to build civic
bonds across religious divisions.
Let us accept this thumbnail sketch of the moral hopes of reform
advocates, and the anxieties of reform opponents. With the arrival of
vouchers and an educational system that place's much more emphasis
37. For a discussion of charter schools, see generally MACEDO, supra note 18.
38. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 23.
39. See JOHN 0. NORQuIST, THE WEALTH OF CITIES: REVITALIZING THE CENTERS OF
AMERICAN LIFE 83-98 (1998). For judicious surveys on the effectiveness of school choice, see
generally Karl L. Alexander & Aaron M. Pallas, School Sector and Cognitive Performance:
When Is a Little a Little?, 58 SOC. EDUC. 115, 115-28 (1985); Christopher Jencks, How Much
Do High School Students Learn?, 58 SOC. EDUC. 128, 128-35 (1985); John F. Witte, Public
Subsidies for Private Schools: What We Know and How to Proceed, 5 EDUC. POL. 206, 206-27
(1992) (arguing that there is reasonably strong evidence that students learn slightly more in
Catholic high schools, and that there is suggestive evidence that the effect is greatest for
students from disadvantaged backgrounds). For recent arguments regarding the advantages of
school choice programs and vouchers, see Jay P. Greene et al., Effectiveness of School Choice:
The Milwaukee Experiment, 31 EDUC. & URBAN SoC'Y 190, 190-213 (1999); Jay P. Greene et




on choice and diversity, it becomes an altogether legitimate question
to ask what are the prospects that private educational institutions
receiving public dollars, including religious institutions, will promote
public purposes? Although there is nothing we can do to altogether
allay concerns about a voucher system that includes religious schools,
there are things that we can do to help insure that voucher recipients
tend to conform with public purposes. I want to defend the strings
that will come attached to vouchers, and argue for their significance.
Transferring public funds to private schools increases the public's
stake in private schools, and the fact is that it will also enlarge the
public's influence over private educational institutions.
SCHOOL VOUCHERS IN CLEVELAND
Should voucher experiments that include religious schools be
foreclosed on federal constitutional grounds? I do not believe so, but
we should make sure that voucher programs are designed to address
legitimate concerns. It would, of course, be crucial that vouchers
would be given to parents and that the money could be spent on a
wide variety of schools, public as well as private, secular as well as
religious. The Supreme Court has already accepted the notion that
state income tax deductions for educational expenses incurred at
religious schools are permissible so long as those deductions include
expenses incurred by parents with children in secular and religious
schools and at public as well as private schools.40 Vouchers go a step
beyond tax exemptions, however, and provide parents with a portion
of public monies. Admittedly, if we accept vouchers as a legitimate
policy choice, constitutional law leaves behind the old principle that
public aid may flow only to those aspects of schooling that are of
public importance and that are "indisputably marked off from the
religious function"'41 (an example would be a state subsidy for bus
transportation to parochial schools). Constitutional law is moving
away from this principle in any case. Moreover, it is not clear that
vouchers should raise any decisive problems so long as parents are
free to choose among a wide variety of types of schools, and there is
good reason to believe that the assistance promotes important public
purposes.
40. See generally Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983) (holding that a state statute that
allowed taxpayers to deduct educational expenses incurred for children did not violate the
Establishment Clause because the benefit to parochial schools resulted from the independent
decisions of parents).
41. Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947).
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It seems clear that voucher programs aim to serve the legitimate
secular purpose of providing an improved education to children of
poorer families and to children in public schools that perform poorly.
It also appears likely that voucher programs can be administered in
such a way as will not excessively entangle the government in
religious affairs. The crucial remaining question under the Supreme
Court's famed "Lemon Test" is whether a voucher plan has the
"primary effect" of aiding religion.42 The details of voucher programs
can help us determine whether public purposes predominate.
In the mid-1990s, the City of Cleveland School District faced an
educational and fiscal crisis so severe that the U.S. District Court for
the Northern District of Ohio ordered the State to take over the
administration of the district. The Ohio Legislature responded by
creating a Scholarship and Tutorial Program. 43 The Act created a
tutorial program for children attending Cleveland public schools,"
and provided for a limited number of scholarships (or vouchers) to
enable students from Cleveland to attend "alternative schools" that
registered for the program.45  These alternative schools could be
private schools in Cleveland, or public schools adjacent to the City of
Cleveland School District.46 Students whose family income was not
more than 200% of the federal poverty level received ninety percent
of their school tuition.47 All other students with higher family incomes
could receive up to seventy-five percent of their tuition, but there was
a fixed ceiling for each student of $2500." The State placed no
restrictions on how the schools may use the money.49
In the original School Voucher Program Plan, enacted by the
Ohio Legislature in 1995, private schools were allowed to admit
students according to the following priorities:
(1) [S]tudents enrolled in the previous year, (2) siblings of students
enrolled in the previous year, (3) students residing within the
school district in which the private school is located by lot, (4)
students whose parents are affiliated with any organization that
42 See Lemon v. Kurzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (reasoning that the Establishment
Clause requires (1) that the statue must have a secular legislative purpose; (2) that the statute's
principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) that
the statute must not foster an excessive government entanglement with religion).
43. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.974-.979 (West 1995).
44. See id. § 3313.975(A).
45. See id.
46. See id. § 3313.974(G).





provides financial support to the school, and (5) all other applicants
by lotA°
As of the beginning of the 1999-2000 academic year, 3801
students were enrolled in the program. 1 Sixty percent of those
students were from families at or below the poverty level.5 2 While
public schools in districts adjacent to the City of Cleveland could
register to receive voucher program students, none of these public
schools bordering on the City of Cleveland agreed to participate.53
Fifty-six private schools registered to participate in the program, and
court records as of 1995 indicate that eighty percent of participating
schools, enrolling eighty-five percent of the Program students, were
sectarian. Some of these schools appeared to have had a pervasively
sectarian character.55  For example, one school's informational
material states that "total religious instruction is the major focus of
the educational program.... Lessons learned in formal religious
classes are purposefully carried over into all subject areas. '5 6
An Ohio State Court of Appeals struck down the Cleveland
voucher experiment on the ground that the Pilot Program, while
neutral on its face, was "skewed toward religion. '57 The appeals court
insisted that the aid program gave parents only the formal freedom to
choose among sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic schools
because of "the lack of public school participation in the scholarship
program."' The lack of participation was especially troubling to the
appeals court because it was within the state's power to design a
program without the bias toward religious schools "by compelling
public school participation in the program."5 9 As the program stood,
the Court concluded that
[t]he only real choice available to most parents is between sending
their child to a sectarian school and having their child remain in the
troubled Cleveland City School District. Such a choice can hardly
be characterized as "genuine and independent." Rather, such a
choice steers aid to sectarian schools, resulting in what amounts to a
50. Id. § 3313.997(A).
51. See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 728-29 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
52 See id.
53. See id. at 728.
54. See id. at 729.
55. See id.
56. Id.
57. Simmons-Harris v. Goff, No. 96. APE 09-982, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1766, at *22
(Ohio Ct. App. May 1, 1997), rev'd, 711 N.E.2d 203 (Ohio 1999).
58. Simmons-Harris, 1997 Ohio App. LEXIS 1766, at *19.




The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the decision just described,
reasoning that the appeals court gave too much weight to the fact that
the vast majority of parents participating in the voucher program
chose sectarian schools.61 The Ohio Supreme Court noted that the
crucial inquiry was whether "the scholarships are allocated on the
basis of neutral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor
religion."62
The Ohio Supreme Court found only one constitutional flaw in
the voucher program's design, and this occurred in the fourth of the
selection priorities that the private schools were allowed to employ in
accepting students.63 That provision allowed sectarian schools to give
priority to "students whose parents are affiliated with any
organization that provides financial support to the school." 64 The
Ohio Supreme Court found that this provision "favor[ed] religion"
and was unconstitutional because it gave parents an incentive to
modify their religious beliefs or practices in order to enhance their
opportunity to receive a scholarship at a particular sectarian school. 6
As a result, the Simmons-Harris court removed the above provision
and found that the voucher program was otherwise good law. 66
The Ohio Legislature quickly re-passed the School Voucher
legislation in response to the Ohio Supreme Court's decision,
omitting the offending "selection priority" provision.67 However, on
August 24, 1999, days before the beginning of the 1999-2000 school
year, a federal district court judge filed an injunction putting a stop to
the program on grounds that it was an unconstitutional establishment
of religion. 68 The federal district court returned to the state appeals
court ruling, and concluded that parents and children in Cleveland
have no "significant choice between parochial and nonparochial
schools" on account of the nonparticipation of public schools adjacent
to Cleveland.69 A few days later, after parents and children who were
60. Id. at *26.
61. See Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 210.
62. Id. (quoting Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 231 (1997).
63. See id.
64. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.977(A) (West 1995).
65. Simmons-Harris, 711 N.E.2d at 210-11.
66. Id. at 211.
67. See OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3313.974-.979 (West 1999).
6& See Simmons-Harris v. Zelman, 54 F. Supp. 2d 725, 741 (N.D. Ohio 1999).
69. Id. at 737. The district court also stated: "In this case.., monies would go directly to
support the regular educational program of a religious institution including, in some cases,
religious instruction." Id. at 741.
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planning to attend schools under the scholarship program had been
thrown into an uproar, the Court issued a stay of the order, but only
for the fall semester.7 0
The upshot of this drama is that the Ohio Legislature, the courts,
and the suburban school districts have put many Cleveland parents
and children eager to take advantage of school choice in a cruel
situation. The real problem with the Scholarship Program, as noted
by the federal court and Ohio Appellate Court, is that Ohio has failed
to require suburban public schools to participate in the program and
give parents a real choice among schools. One hopes that Ohio will
respond by expanding choice, rather than deciding that choice is not
worth the political cost of allowing poor inner-city children access to
the educational advantages of public schools outside of Cleveland.
The courts improved the voucher program (as I argue below)
and have given the Legislature an opportunity to improve the
voucher program. If the Legislature is serious about improving the
quality of educational opportunities available to the children of
Cleveland, it should mandate that suburban school districts with
available spaces must accept Cleveland voucher students. That would
give scholarship recipients a genuine choice among public and
private, secular and sectarian schooling. In addition, it would allow
the Ohio Legislature to make a more powerful case that school choice
is not designed to favor religious schools, but is being used to advance
a variety of public purposes including promoting competition among
schools and integrating students of varying racial and economic
classes. The State of Ohio now has an opportunity to deliver a better
choice program that is also more defensible in constitutional terms.
It is worth highlighting certain features of the revised legislation.
To receive vouchers, some schools -including sectarian schools-will
have to redefine themselves as institutions and communities more
attuned to public values.71  Specifically, the Ohio Legislature
conditioned participation in the Scholarship Program on the
requirement that registered private schools do not discriminate on the
basis of religion or teach hatred on the basis of religion.7 Thus, all
schools will have to adopt the value of religious nondiscrimination
when it comes to the admission of voucher students. One suspects
70. On November 5, 1999, a sharply divided U.S. Supreme Court issued an order
permitting Cleveland to operate the voucher program, pending the federal court's ruling on the
program's constitutionality. See Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 120 S. Ct. 443, 443 (1999).




that this accommodation of religious schools to public norms could
alter the nature of religious schools as communities. Participating
religious schools must treat children of diverse faiths (with vouchers)
equally in admissions. Educationally attractive sectarian institutions
will tend to become places in which children of all faiths (with
vouchers) have a right to be selected and, therefore, become
members of the school community regardless of whether they share
the religious beliefs of the schools. It seems very likely that these
legally "entitled" students will bring with them additional public
pressures to create a welcoming and nondiscriminatory atmosphere
for children of all faiths or no faith at all. One can easily foresee
problems for the religious schools if enrolled voucher children felt
that that they were being pressured to either conform with religious
beliefs and practices or leave the school. The school's affiliation with
the particular sponsoring religious community may be somewhat
muted, even attenuated, or at least revised as a consequence: religious
references in the curriculum may become more ecumenical, or else
perhaps robust expressions of sectarianism will tend to be confined to
certain voluntary aspects of the curriculum. As a result, it can be
expected that these legitimate public conditions on the schools that
receive vouchers will likely exert pressures that will substantially alter
the nature of some schools.
It is also significant that the Ohio Supreme Court raised no
difficulties with the third selection criterion, which allows alternative
schools to favor children residing within the school district in which
the private school is located. According to that provision, sectarian
schools receiving vouchers may favor children from within a
geographical community but not a religious community.
Interestingly, this is exactly what traditional public schools do: they
are common educational institutions for all of the children living
within a geographical area, irrespective of differences of religion,
race, or class.
The voucher law that temporarily succeeded in passing
constitutional muster had, therefore, a variety of interesting and
highly nonneutral features. Religious schools that utilize "sectarian"
principles in admissions decisions must remake themselves as a
condition of receiving public monies. Moreover, they must remake
themselves not simply in superficial ways but in ways that seem likely
to alter the nature of these schools as moral communities. These
religious schools must become a bit more like public-or, as they
were once called, "common" -schools: educating all the children of a
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geographical community irrespective of sectarian beliefs. It is hardly
surprising, nor does it seem in principle wrong, that religious schools
receiving public monies are required to become a bit more like public
educational institutions appropriate to a pluralistic extended republic.
No doubt the schools receiving public funds are likely to face
additional informal pressures from voucher students, their parents,
and the larger political community.
Important battles of the future will concern the conditions that
state legislatures should or are allowed to impose upon religious
schools and other institutions that accept public monies. Many
religious school advocates worry that public vouchers will be
accompanied by public regulations (such as those described in the
previous section) amounting to a "poison pill" undermining the
robustness and distinctiveness of the religious elements in parochial
schooling.
SCHOOL VOUCHERS IN MILWAUKEE
School voucher legislation in Milwaukee has not been subject to
as elaborate an array of judicial hurdles as in Cleveland, and yet the
program has evolved significantly in response to constitutional and
political concerns. Up to fifteen percent of the children in the
Milwaukee public school system are allowed to participate,'7 and they
can attend both sectarian and nonsectarian private schools at state
expense.74 Participating schools receive the per-pupil share of state
aid to the city's public schools, which amounted to $4400 for the 1996-
1997 school year.75 Of the 122 private schools in Milwaukee, thirty-
three are nonsectarian and approximately eighty-nine are sectarian.76
Sectarian schools enroll about eighty-four percent of the city's
students attending private schools. 77 Some of these sectarian schools
are pervasively religious, and their informational materials claim that
teachers have been trained to "integrate God's Word across the
curriculum. "78
73. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 4003 (West 1995).
74. See id. § 4002.
75. See Jackson v. Benson, 570 N.W.2d 407, 413 (Wis. Ct. App. 1997). However, the law
also stipulates that the payments to private schools cannot exceed the "operating and debt
service costs per-pupil that is related to educational programming" as determined by the State.
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 4006(M).





Two features of the Milwaukee voucher program are worth
highlighting. The Milwaukee voucher plan contains provisions,
similar to those in the Cleveland plan, regarding selecting students.
The provisions are only used in situations when more children with
vouchers apply to a particular school than the school can
accommodate. In such a situation, children are accepted on the basis
of a lottery system, but preferences can be given to children already
enrolled and their siblings. Schools can still work to insure that
parents and children understand the distinctive mission and nature of
their schools before they apply or accept the offer of admission. In
addition, and importantly, the Milwaukee Legislature added a
provision that requires that children with vouchers should be able to
"opt-out" of any religious activity that they or their parents find
objectionable.79 This rule goes a step beyond Cleveland's program in
helping to insure that religious exercises are voluntary in schools
receiving vouchers. An initial survey suggests that none of the 6300
children enrolled in the voucher program, most of whom are in
Catholic, Protestant, or Islamic schools, are opting out of mandatory
religious exercises. 80
Nevertheless, Joe Laconte, writing in the conservative Heritage
Foundation's Policy Review, worries that the opt-out requirement
and the admission policy could discourage some religious schools
from participating in the program.81 Some religiously affiliated
schools "tend to oppose the opt-out clause on principle or won't risk
its impact on the classroom. '82 The provision is most objectionable to
conservative Protestant schools for whom "the fingerprints of faith
are nearly everywhere," schools "that connect academic subjects to
biblical themes, from science classes that probe the origins of life, to
history lessons that emphasize the religious faith of the America's
founders."83
Some religious schools also oppose any effort to distinguish
academic or disciplinary requirements from their religious mission. 84
As Joseph McTighe of the Council of American Private Education
puts it, "[t]hese schools don't want to compromise the purpose for
79. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 4008(E).
80. See Joe Laconte, Paying the Piper: Will Vouchers Undermine the Mission of Religious







which they exist." For such schools, there will be some uncertainty
about exactly what constitutes a "religious exercise" from which
children have a right to be excused, and this uncertainty also bothers
those who run these schools. The American Civil Liberties Union or
other groups who object to public funding of religious programs that
seem to verge on indoctrination might file lawsuits. This possibility
might lead schools that are accepting vouchers to place more
emphasis on secular subjects and to make religious exercises a
discrete part of the curriculum. Pressures to do such things can be
seen as public influences at odds with the autonomy and integrity of
some religious institutions, especially pervasively religious
institutions. Catholic and many other church-affiliated schools have
accepted the conditions. However, the most conservative Protestant
schools-those in which "[elverything is taught with regard to God's
word and how it applies in our lives"-have refused to accept voucher
students.8 They worry that the restrictions will undermine their
ability to preserve the sort of religious atmosphere they want.
How should we feel about the existence of such pressures?
Should we regard the policies that generate them as examples of
impermissible government nonneutrality toward religion: a deviation
from McConnell's ideal world in which governments must strive to
avoid influencing people's religious beliefs and practices, even when
that influence amounts to the promotion of a shared civic framework?
Should the likelihood of such pressures make us feel better or worse
about voucher programs that include religious schools? Do such
regulations amount to unacceptable means of pressuring conservative
religious communities to tone down and moderate their religious
strictures? Will public monies have the effect of requiring religious
schools to treat religious exercises as options that are not essential to
the core curriculum, like extra-curricular activities?
The details of voucher programs matter. The design of
admissions procedures and opt-out provisions can help insure that
schools receiving public monies are relatively open to all the children
in the polity on a nondiscriminatory basis. Of course, these
provisions are not simply regulations about administrative details.
Rather, they have the effect of reconstituting private institutions in
ways that make them more conformable with public values. They





vouchers-perhaps dampening some forms of religious diversity.
Further, altering the nature of religious schools will likely exert
pressure on religious communities more broadly.
Contrary to McConnell's concerns, none of this seems
objectionable to me so long as the conditions that attach to vouchers
have legitimate public justifications. It is inevitable and appropriate
that the receipt of vouchers by a private school gives the public a
greater stake in the way the school conducts its business. The
justification for vouchers is (or should be) that they allow us to pursue
public purposes more effectively. That being said, imposing public
conditions and public expectations on the conduct of schools that
receive vouchers is altogether appropriate. The opt-out provisions
help insure that children will not have religious exercises imposed
upon them-though there would still be worries about peer pressures
to conform. The array of public conditions considered here-opt-out
provisions and bans on religious preferences in admissions-help
make the schools participating in voucher programs more open and
inclusive environments that welcome all of the city's children and not
simply co-religionists.
The public educational purposes that have influenced the design
and growth of public schooling for 150 years will not and should not
be put aside just because new instruments of public policy are being
utilized. Voucher programs should be designed in such a way as to
advance our full range of public purposes. More specifically, the
programs should not simply strive for "academic achievement"
(though that is quite important), but also strive for equal educational
opportunity, and the pursuit of inclusion and mixing across
boundaries of religion, race, class, and other important divisions.
Constitutional concerns about allowing public monies to flow to
religious schools should be assuaged by public regulations that help
insure that schools receiving public monies are conforming with the
public values of a diverse republic. The inevitable concomitant, of
course, is that the flow of public monies acts as a vehicle by which
public values further "colonize" the private realm, including the
religious realm. I see no way around that fact, nor do I see why it
must be regarded as objectionable. The recourse for religious and
other private institutions that wish to resist public values is to not
become conduits for public monies dedicated to public purposes.
Schools receiving students with voucher dollars will have to
accept the fact that they are liable to feel the pressure not only from
explicit public requirements, but also from a variety of more informal
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public norms. In fact, the pressures and worries beginning to be
experienced by religious schools receiving vouchers are not new.
Similar sorts of pressures have long been felt by religiously affiliated
organizations receiving public funds for the delivery of social services.
Religious nonprofits have long received substantial public funding
and the "charitable choice" provision of the 1996 Federal Welfare
Reform Act encourages government to channel more social services
funding to religious groups. The Council on Civil Society endorses
this development and urges the President and Congress to
"strengthen and expand" it so that faith-based organizations can
"compete on equal terms with other private groups for government
contracts," without "denying or relinquishing their religious
charter." s But how should we feel about what seems inevitable: that
as a consequence of receiving public funds some faith-based
organizations will experience pressures to alter the way they express
their religious convictions?
MIXING SACRED AND SECULAR IN THE NONPROFIT SECTOR
Let us now consider an interesting account of the experiences of
the religious nonprofit organization, an account that seems to me
instructive in light of the above concerns. The lessons from these
organizations suggest that public regulations help infuse religious
institutions with a broader array of public norms and expectations,
and, as a result, civic purposes will tend to be served even though it
may be difficult (and self-defeating) to actively police the inner
workings of civil society institutions.
The private nonprofit sector is enormous and crucial to the
delivery of social services in America. Consider first of all that there
are 1.4 million nonprofit associations in the United States with a total
income estimated at nearly $320 billion.8 Eleven percent of the
American workforce or sixteen million persons work in this sector,
which includes a majority of American hospitals, a substantial portion
of our nursing homes and educational institutions, and the bulk of
social service delivery.8 9  Nonprofit organizations are deeply
dependent on government funding: nonprofits as a whole receive
87. COUNCIL ON CIVIL SOC'Y, supra note 1, at 21.
8& See STEPHEN V. MONSMA, WHEN SACRED AND SECULAR Mix: RELIGIOUS




thirty-one percent of their income from government sources.90
Religiously-based organizations make up a substantial portion of
the nonprofit sector. Moreover, religiously based hospitals, nursing
homes, schools, and social service programs are vital social service
providers in the United States, and they are, like other nonprofits,
heavily dependent on public monies. Consider the striking fact that
seventy-five percent of the annual budget of the Roman Catholic
Archdiocese of New York-$1.75 billion-comes from government
sources.91 Nearly $200 million a year goes to Catholic Relief Services
from various government contracts and grants. 92 Prominent Catholic,
Jewish, and Protestant groups receive large portions of their revenues
from government sources: 65% for Catholic charities, 75% for the
Jewish Board of Family and Children's Services, and 95% for the
Lutheran Social Ministries.93
What is the consequence of this dependence for the religious
missions of nonprofits? Are public monies subsidizing religious
activities? Are religious values being transformed in ways that
represent an infringement on the autonomy of religious communities?
Some recent evidence provides support for the view that public
influences on religious organizations may be substantial and salutary
from a civic standpoint.
Stephen V. Monsma is among those who argue that we should
try to correct the nonneutral effects of the religious reliance on public
monies because these effects compromise the autonomy and integrity
of religious communities.94 Religious persons, according to Monsma,
must be free to follow the dictates of their conscience "without
penalty or hindrance."9 Religious groups must be free to define their
own identity: "fundamental to a religious group's autonomy is its
right to define for itself its doctrines, practices, purposes, and
goals.... It is a serious violation of a religious group's autonomy for
outside groups or the government to dictate belief and practice." 96
From this, Monsma contends that insofar as government dictates
90. See id. at 4.
91. See id. at 10.
92. See id.
93. See id. at 1; see also STEPHEN BATES, NATIONAL SERVICE: GETTING THINGS DoNE?
45 (1996) (reporting similar figures for nonsectarian charities: 60% of the revenues for Save the
Children are government provided, 78% for CARE, and 80% for the United Cerebral Palsy
Association).
94. See MONSMA, supra note 88, at 1.
95. Id. at 19.
96. Id. at 20.
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religious "doctrines, practices, purposes, and goals," it obviously runs
beyond its proper sphere and should be curbed.97 The more difficult
question is when, if ever, in pursuing legitimate public purposes such
as those we have discussed in the case of education, can government
exert illegitimate influences over religious communities-influences
that violate their religious "autonomy" and integrity.
Monsma's study of these questions is fascinating. He conducted
a survey of 760 nonprofit organizations from the educational and
social service fields. A large number of these nonprofits were
religiously based, and Monsma's purpose was to see what effect the
flow of public monies is having on faith-based nonprofits. In spite of
his concern that public pressures are eroding religious autonomy,
Monsma reports that the vast majority of religious nonprofits
reported feeling no pressures from government officials to curtail or
eliminate religious practices. This was even true of those
organizations ranking highest on a "Religious Practices Scale"
measuring the thoroughness of an organization's religious
orientation.98 In Monsma's survey, seventy-eight percent of the heads
of those religious colleges and universities ranked in the most
thoroughly religious category "failed to report even one instance of
pressures or problems over their religious practices from
government." 99 The findings were similar for child service agencies. 10
Religiously-based nonprofit organizations are full and active
participants in publicly subsidized social service activities. Equally
striking, public officials impose far less direct pressure on religiously
based nonprofits than one might have expected. 101 Even those
nonprofits that rank at the high end of the "religious practice" scale -
those who select employees based on agreement with the
organization's religious beliefs, who favor students or clients in
agreement with the religious doctrines, child service agencies that say
prayers at meals, etc.-encounter surprisingly little direct and overt
pressure from the government to curtail these activities.1°2 Indeed,
among child service and international relief organizations, religiously-
based agencies report fewer problems of government interference
97. Id. at 20-21.
9& See id. at 82.
99. 1& at 84.





than do purely secular organizations.103 The flow of public monies to
the nonprofit sector has been eased by the fact that constitutional
principles that might raise warning flags -constitutional norms to the
effect that when public monies flow to religious institutions they are
to be used for public purposes only-have not been strictly enforced
in this area of public policy.1°4 This means, of course, that public
funds are being used to subsidize the religious activities of religious
organizations. Many religiously-based, child-service agencies that
receive public funds have spoken prayers at meals, require other
religious activities, hire only staff who agree with the organization's
religious orientation, and have a paid chaplain on the staff.15 The
same sorts of practices are bound to go on in religious schools
receiving vouchers. In the social service sector, these practices
sometimes become points of contention with public officials but not
as frequently as one might have expected. The picture that emerges
from Monsma's study is that religious primary and secondary
educational institutions may be unique in the degree to which strict
separationist mandates have been vigorously enforced.1°t
Part of the reason for the under-enforcement of separationist
constitutional norms is, no doubt, because of the sense that
religiously-based social service institutions are providing vital public
benefits and often doing so more effectively than public
bureaucracies. In addition, once government monies are flowing to
care-giving agencies with broad supervisory responsibilities, enforcing
public rules against religious activities would be difficult and
disruptive. Moreover, a thorough enforcement of constitutional
norms would raise precisely the sorts of "entanglement" worries that
the Supreme Court has said can be enough to trigger a constitutional
prohibition on government aid in the first instance.
103. See id.
104. See Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947) (allowing states to reimburse
parents of children in religious schools for public transportation costs because transportation
was clearly separable from the religious mission of religious schools).
105. In the past, the Court has been most suspicious when public funds flow to institutions
with a pervasively sectarian atmosphere. Supreme Court decisions made it clear that statutes
which distribute public monies to religious schools cannot have the primary effect of advancing
or inhibiting religion and cannot foster excessive entanglement with religion. See generally
School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (holding that program which allowed
public school teacher to visit religious schools to teach classes had the primary or principal
effect of advancing religion and violated the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
But see Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (departing from the rule established in School
District of Grand Rapids and allowing public schoolteachers to provide remedial education to
low-income, special needs children in religious schools.
106. See MONSMA, supra note 88, at 75, 89-99.
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Public policy displays a decided flexibility in this area. A
working accommodation balances constitutional concerns that
government should not promote or subsidize religion against the
competing conviction that religious agencies are crucial to the
delivery of important social services. Nevertheless, as noted above,
Monsma worries about the extent to which the current system
compromises religious autonomy. He may be right in thinking that
some adjustment in the terms of these bargains would be useful, but
we need to be careful not to adopt an unwarranted demand that
government must abstain from exerting any nonneutral effects on
religious communities.
Monsma argues for principles of "equal treatment" and "positive
neutrality" according to which government should be neutral "toward
persons of all faiths and those of none. This means government
should neither advantage nor disadvantage any particular religion,
nor should its actions either advantage or disadvantage religion in
general or secularism in general."1 7 Public money should be allowed
to fund "the programs and activities of religiously based nonprofits
that are of a temporal, this-world benefit to society, as long as public
funds are supporting similar or parallel programs of all religious
traditions without favoritism and of similar or parallel programs of a
secular nature, whether sponsored by secularly based nonprofits or
government itself."' 8  Government should take positive steps to
insure that "[p]rograms of certain religious traditions would not be
favored over any others."'19
I agree with Monsma that, under some conditions, it should be
acceptable for public monies to flow to faith-based agencies and
programs that have religious elements woven into them. For this
funding to be acceptable, it would have to be available to a wide
variety of religious and secular agencies and programs, and recipients
would need to have a real choice of programs so that they are not
pressured into submitting to religious impositions as a consequence of
their need for publicly supported assistance. Monsma accepts these
strictures.
Nevertheless, we need to be careful not to embrace false
expectations about the "neutrality" of public policies. There is no
principled imperative that government actions must be maximally





neutral in their effects on religious communities and believers. It
might be that we have good public reasons for subsidizing some faith-
based schools and other social welfare agencies, but that does not
mean that we must avoid exerting pressures on those private
institutions that receive public funds to open their doors to all
beneficiaries regardless of faith.
Part of the reason is that it will likely be impossible to insure that
all recipients of social services (including school children) will have
anything like the same freedom to choose among good schools or
service providers. Wealthier, more popular, and longer established
religious communities will often have greater resources and superior
institutions. Many children or other recipients of social services may
want to take advantage of the agency (or school) that is nearest to
home or perceived to be "best" in some important respect. These
considerations argue for encouraging or requiring publicly funded
service providers to create an atmosphere which is open to all and in
which students or clients are not pressured to conform to religious
strictures as a price of receiving aid. Of course, Catholic schools,
Catholic Charities, and many other, religiously-based educational and
social service providers already operate this way.
Monsma is concerned, however, about the autonomy of religious
communities and the integrity of religious beliefs. Citing the
important work of sociologists Paul DiMaggio and Walter Powell,n0
Monsma worries that
[c]ultural expectations may have a coercive effect, rising standards
of professionalization may lead to subtle pressures, and-most
important -the uncertain environment created by uncertain legal
standards may lead religiously based nonprofits to model
themselves after already existing organizations that are less
religious and whose receipt of public funds is more clearly
legitimate. The tendency may be for religiously based nonprofits
receiving public money to drop or tone down their distinctive
religious characteristics, thereby making themselves more like their
secular or nominally religious counterparts who are successfully
receiving public funds.'
Moreover, Monsma echoes some of Stephen Carter's complaints,
pointing out that religious leaders and organizations are really only
welcomed into the public sphere when they are willing to stress
110. See generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited:
Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV.
147 (1983).
111. MONSMA, supra note 88, at 163.
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"broad, consensual themes of good citizenship, respect for others, and
acts of charity."' 2 "Thus," Monsma continues, "the head of a
religiously based social welfare agency is welcomed into community
groups and is respected by local news media as long as she does not
critique the moral-religious views of others or appeal to church
authority or biblical standards to support a controversial position. ' 113
If, on the other hand, she breaks the rules of acceptable public
discourse, "there is an embarrassed silence and countless clues will
inform her she has transgressed certain unwritten rules of the
game.... The subtle pressures are there. 11 4
We also need to keep in mind, however, that not all "cultural
expectations" are "coercive," and not all of the "subtle pressures"
that public policy exerts with respect to religious belief are to be
regretted or apologized for. That religious communities receiving
public monies feel pressured to conform to some public expectations
is perfectly natural and even salutary from a public standpoint.
Insofar as the public chooses to rely on private associations to
promote the public's interest in moral and civic education, and insofar
as those private agencies voluntarily accept a share of public monies,
we should hope that public policy tilts in favor of such public values
as fairness among all citizens, equal access, and openness to outsiders.
We can certainly join Monsma in recognizing and applauding the
contribution that religiously-based nonprofits make to the public
good, and I do not want to suggest that all is necessarily well in this
sphere. I agree that we should drop the old principle that public
funds may only assist faith-based institutions when those funds
support secular functions that can be strictly separated from the
religious mission. However, we should not aim to immunize faith-
based institutions receiving public funds from all pressures toward
openness and inclusion. If religious believers sometimes feel they are
being asked to "tone down" their religiosity, that will often be the
price of agreeing to serve as a provider of public services.
To his credit, Monsma sees both sides of the issue and advocates
protection of a core set of public values. He insists that public funds
should be denied to programs and activities that are primarily other-
worldly in nature: "Such activities as worship services, the
construction of chapels, or classes in religious doctrine could not be
112 Id. at 163-64.




funded under positive neutrality.""' 5 He also insists that all nonprofit
organizations receiving public monies have "an obligation to be
supportive of the basic norms and rules of the game that unite the
American people," including "the worth and dignity of all
persons ... the rule of law, the right to privacy, and freedom of
expression... [and] a sense of civility and tolerance.11 6 He would
deny public funds to groups that teach "hatred and intolerance or in
other ways work to destroy the social fabric fundamental to civil
society.""' He would allow religious organizations receiving funds to
favor persons of their own religious traditions in their hiring practices,
but they should not be allowed to engage in racial or ethnic
discrimination.118 The upshot is that Monsma wants to do a bit more
to insure that religious organizations do not need to denature
themselves when providing publicly subsidized services, so long as
those religious organizations are not deeply at odds with basic public
principles. I am arguing that the array of public purposes is richer
than Monsma recognizes.
We should, as a constitutional matter, allow experimentation to
take place at the intersection of church and state when it comes to
education and the provision of social welfare services. The polity
benefits enormously from the moral energies of religious
communities when it comes to education and care for the aged, the
sick, drug users, orphans, etc. Nevertheless, we should also try to
insure that public policies are attentive to the full range of public
values. If religious agencies are being deterred from entering the
social service delivery field on account of restrictions on their ability
to remain faithful to their religious missions, and there are extensive
unmet needs among the sick and elderly and others in need of care,
then perhaps constitutional rules should be eased somewhat more
than I suggest. But if most religious schools are willing to accept the
115. Id. at 180. Monsma continues, "if the overall mission or program of the religious
nonprofit has this-world benefits to society and if its programs and activities are not dominated
by and built around required religious exercises or efforts at proselytizing, their existence does
not pose a problem." Id. at 186. He also says that all groups receiving public funds would have
to submit to "minimal, nonintrusive accountability standards" to insure that they are actually
delivering on the civic programs and purposes that justify public support. Id. at 180.
116. Id. at 181.
117. Id. Private organizations should follow the old Christian adage of "[h]ate the sin but
love the sinner." Id.
118. See id. at 188-89. Monsma also argues that "[s]ome gender discrimination should be
allowed in the case of nonprofits from religious traditions with long-standing and sincerely held
beliefs that make gender-based role distinctions." Id. at 189. Moreover, religious organizations
should not be required to accept and condone homosexual behavior. See id. at 188.
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conditions contained in' the Milwaukee and Cleveland voucher
programs, and the vast majority of faith-based non profits are
reasonably content with the current rules governing funding-as by
Monsma's own account they seem to be-then attaching strings to
public funds for the sake of fostering openness and inclusion in civil
society appears to be well worth the price.
CONCLUSION: THE NECESSITY OF PROMOTING LIBERAL VALUES IN
ALL SPHERES OF LIFE
It seems to me that we have every reason to think more about
the contributions that civil society institutions can make to the moral
infrastructure of modem liberal democracies. It is very important,
however, that we not mistake the grounds for placing greater weight
on civil society. It would be wrong to proceed based on the mistaken
assumption that the sphere of liberal democratic civil society is a
sphere of radical diversity and idiosyncrasy. It would be equally
wrong to suppose that "freedom of association" requires freedom
from influence, freedom from differential incentives, or the right to
live in a world where public policy strives to avoid influencing the way
that people use their freedom.
Oddly, proponents of placing greater reliance on civil society
institutions sometimes make diametrically opposed arguments about
why we should do so. In a recent paper arguing for school choice, for
example, Michael McConnell insists that parental choice and
educational diversity are justified because America has always been
characterized by too much pluralism, too much religious and cultural
diversity, for a system of common schooling to be possible.119 To be
truly common, the substantive curriculum of the common schools
would have to be extremely thin. Any education with real moral
substance, on the other hand, is too controversial and sectarian to
justify promoting through public policy. So, McConnell argues, the
deep pluralism of America-symbolized by its religious diversity-
argues for parental choice and educational diversity.
On the other hand, and in the same paper, McConnell makes an
altogether different and far more powerful argument in favor of
school choice, an argument advanced by recent proponents of
Catholic schooling: namely, that school choice that includes religious
119. See generally MICHAEL W. MCCONNELL, Education Disestablishment: Why Democratic
Values Are Ill-Served by Democratic Control of Schooling, in NOMOS XLIII: MORAL AND
POLITICAL EDUCATION (Stephen Macedo & Yael Tamir eds., forthcoming 2000).
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schooling would serve public values more effectively than today's
public schools. It is not only that religious schools would increase test
scores and lower dropout rates, but that they would also help
counteract some of the unfortunate cultural tendencies which are
reflected in today's public schools: the rampant materialism, the loss
of discipline, the hedonism and acceptance of premature sexuality,
the absence of authoritative guidance, and the surrender to youth
culture.
Which is it? Should we adopt a policy of educational choice
because we have no common values, no civic ideals? Or because a
greater degree of choice would better serve public values properly
understood? I contend that the latter approach is the correct way of
thinking about how public policy should orient itself with respect to
questions of educational reform and civil society generally. The case
for including religious schools-which are mainly Catholic schools-
in voucher programs is greatly strengthened by the fact that
Catholicism has finally accepted basic liberal principles of equal
freedom for citizens of diverse faiths. When Antony Bryk and his
colleagues make the case that Catholic schooling serves the "common
good," they rightly begin with an account of Vatican II, and
emphasize the importance of this revolutionary change in the
doctrines of the Church. 120 Now that these changes are in place, it is
much easier to appreciate the many good qualities of Catholic
education.
We should take fuller advantage of all the educative and
character forming resources at our disposal. Part of what might
happen as a consequence of school reform, and the great revival of
interest in civil society institutions-part of what should happen in
any case-is that we will think about the means of civic education
more broadly than we have in the past. This means that we will
increasingly face the difficult task of negotiating conflicts and tensions
among basic public values and some of the most powerful and deeply
held nonpublic values. Liberals will have to face up to the fact that
the success of our constitutional experiment depends upon our ability
to constitute not only political institutions but also civil society
institutions and patterns of social life which inevitably do much of the
work of moral and political education in a free society.
120. See generally ANTHONY S. BRYK ET AL., CATHOLIC SCHOOLING AND THE COMMON
GOOD (1993).
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